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Abstract Ritual (li) is central to Confucian ethics and political philosophy. Robert
Neville believes that Chinese Philosophy has an important role to play in our times by
bringing ritual theory to the analysis of global moral and political issues. In a recent
work, Neville maintains that ritual ‘needs a contemporary metaphysical expression if
its importance is to be seen.’ This paper examines Neville's claim through a detailed
study of the ‘ethics of ritual’ in one of the early Confucian texts, the Xunzi. This text
has sometimes been read as offering a form of naturalism in its discussions of ‘heaven
(tian)’ as analogous to Western, even modern, concept of ‘nature,’ while other
interpreters insist that tian is a normative notion. Does this concept of tian offer
a metaphysical ground for ethics of ritual advocated in the text? If so, what kind of
metaphysics is it? Does Confucian ritual ethics need any metaphysical grounding?
There is no specific metaphysical theory in the Xunzi and passages which could be
referring to or implying metaphysical assumptions are open to hermeneutical debates.
Even if metaphysical assumptions are necessary or beneficial to an ethics of ritual, the
paper argues that the ‘metaphysical flexibility’ of the text could work to its advantage
in remaining relevant in contemporary context. The conclusion explores some pos-
sible directions for further exploring the metaphysics of ritual in a modern under-
standing of Xunzi.
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This article is inspired by Robert Neville’s recommendation that Chinese philoso-
phers today re-sort the cannon to give the Xunzi greater weight, because that text is
most concerned with li and has much that is illuminating to say about it.1 Neville
believes Confucian ritual theory has important contributions to make to the analysis
of global moral and political issues.2 He maintains that Xunzi’s philosophy recog-
nizes that ‘ritual has a fundamental metaphysical or ontological status’ as it is ‘the
principle element by which human beings complete Heaven and Earth.’3 Philoso-
phers working on early Confucian texts are divided on the question of whether there
is metaphysics in pre-Qin Confucian texts. Few would disagree that the concerns in
the Analects, the Mencius, and the Xunzi are primarily practical. Passages in early
Chinese texts that are apparently metaphysical may be dismissed by the anti-
metaphysics party as inconsequential for the issues of real concern, and best ignored,
especially when they seem nonsensical or indefensible to modern sensibilities. Their
opponents disagree, insisting that even when not explicit, metaphysical assumptions
are inevitable and necessary. This may be true up to a point; one’s belief about the
kind of cosmos one lives in and human beings’ place within that cosmos would have
some effect on one’s moral vision and commitment. However, such a relationship
between metaphysics and ethics does not mean that debates over ethics necessarily or
even frequently are resolved at the level of convincing others of one’s metaphysical
assumptions – indeed what drives the trend against metaphysics in the last century is
precisely the perceived irresolvable speculative nature of metaphysics, and the
conviction that philosophical debates have a better chance of resolution when one
brackets out the metaphysical, and that metaphysical assumptions, even if inevitable,
only gain credence from theories defensible by empirical inquiry or rational argu-
ments that are based on those assumptions rather than the other way round.
I am curious to know how far the Xunzi goes with this recognition of the
metaphysical. Does the text actually offer a clear and consistent metaphysics? The
1 Robert Cummings Neville, ‘New Projects in Chinese Philosophy,’ Pluralist, 5.2 (Summer 2010), 45–56.
Besides Antonio Cua’s Ethical Argumentation: a study in Hsün Tzu’s moral epistemology (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1985), and articles written over a few decades collected in his Human Nature,
Ritual, and History: studies in Xunzi and Chinese Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 2005), Xunzi has attracted more attention in the past decade among scholars writing in
English. Some recent works include Paul Rakita Goldin, Rituals of the Way: the Philosophy of Xunzi
(Chicago: Open Court, 1999); T.C. Kline III and P.J. Ivanhoe (eds), Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in
the Xunzi (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000); T.C. Kline III (ed.), Ritual and Religion in the Xunzi (New York:
Seven Bridges Press, 2002); Masayuki Sato, The Confucian Quest for Order: the origin and formation of
the political thought of Xunzi (Leiden: Brill, 2003); Janghee Lee, Xunzi and Early Chinese Naturalism
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005); Kurtis Hagen, The Philosophy of Xunzi: a recon-
struction (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007). Compared to Confucius and Mencius, Xunzi
still receives little attention in Chinese scholarship, although some recent works on Xunzi have been
published over the last decade, for example, Wang Tianhai (ed.), Mingjia jiangjie xunzi (Authoritative
Interpretations of Xunzi) (Changchun: Changchun Press, 2009); Chen Wenjie, Xunzi de bianshuo (Xunzi’s
Arguments) (Beijing: Huaxia Press, 2008); Wu Shuqin, lixue shiye zhong de Xunzi renxue (Xunzi’s Human
Learning from the Perspective of Ritual Study) (Jinan: Qilu, 2007); Li Zhexian, Xunzi zhi mingxue xilun
(Explaining Xunzi’s Theory of Names) (Taipei: Wenjin, 2005); Han Deming, Xunzi yu Rujia de shehui
lixiang (Xunzi and Confucian Social Ideal) (Jinan: Qilu, 2001).
2 Neville, ‘New Projects.’ For a more detailed account of how such an approach to global problems might
take, see also his Normative Cultures (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995).
3 Neville, Ritual and Deference: Extending Chinese Philosophy in a Comparative Context (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2008), p.95. See also Normative Cultures, chapter 7.
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following examination of the text shows that there is no such account. If what we can
find are at best implicit metaphysical assumptions, do these assumptions cohere
sufficiently for us to reconstruct a distinctive and specific metaphysics of ritual? I
shall argue that Xunzi’s metaphysical assumptions were pragmatic in that Xunzi’s
main concern was defending his ritual theory and metaphysical assumptions were
implied only when needed for that defense. The article presents some examples of
scholarly attempts at reconstruction of the fragmentary textual evidence that might be
touching on metaphysical issues to show that more than one and possibly mutually
incompatible metaphysical theories could support Xunzi’s ritual theory. It is difficult
to claim that there is a specific metaphysics that is necessary to the ritual ethics, even
if one agrees that some kind of metaphysics is needed; this gives rise to a kind of
‘metaphysical flexibility’ that could work to the benefit of the ethics insofar as its
contemporary viability is concerned, since this flexibility means that, if whatever
metaphysical assumptions made by the text turn out to be unacceptable today in some
way, it would then be possible to substitute an alternative or a more defensible
metaphysics to support the ethical claims—if one believes that any viable ethical
claims require a coherent and viable metaphysics. Besides having more choice among
different metaphysical theories, given that the possibly metaphysical textual refer-
ences are often vague and sometimes inconsistent, could we dispense with the
metaphysics altogether and recover only Xunzi’s ritual theory as an ethic still relevant
to contemporary life? Is metaphysics required to make (better) sense of ritual ethics,
or does it increase the viability or impact of ritual ethics? I shall conclude with some
reflections on why there might be pragmatic reasons for Confucians today interested
in the ethical significance of ritual to engage in metaphysical inquiry, and what kind
of inquiry that might turn out to be.
Li禮 (Ritual) in Chinese Culture
The Chinese term, ‘li禮,’ has been translated as ‘ritual,’ among alternatives including
‘rite,’ ‘ceremony,’ ‘ritual action,’ ‘ritual propriety,’ ‘propriety,’ ‘code of conduct,’
‘decorum,’ ‘manners,’ ‘courtesy,’ and ‘civility.’ The earliest written form is believed
to depict objects used in practices identifiable today as rituals, with religious,
communicative, transformative, and expressive dimensions.4 The Chinese have paid
close attention to li, and have emphasized its importance and value since the very
beginning of their civilization. Based on archeological evidence, the oracle bones and
bronzes from the Shang and Zhou dynasties, the earliest li were probably those in
worship of deities identified with the rivers, mountains, or the ‘four quarters,’ and in
4 Wu Shizhou, Liangzhou liqi zhidu yanjiu (A Research on the Institution of Ritual Vessels during the Zhou
Dynasties) (Taipei: Wunan Press and Chinese Development Fund Management Committee, 2004), pp.2-3.
On the different approaches to ritual in anthropology, see entry on ‘Ritual’ by D. Parkin, in Smelser, Neil J.
and Paul B. Baltes (editors in chief), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences
(Amsterdam & New York: Elsevier, 2001), pp.13368-71. For discussion among social scientists of the
definition of ritual, Margaret Mead, ‘Ritual and Social Crisis,’ 87–102 in James D. Shaughnessy (ed.), The
Roots of Ritual (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1973), pp.87-88; Nancy Munn, ‘Symbolism in a Ritual Context:
Aspects of Symbolic Action,’ 579–612 in John J. Honigmann (ed), Handbook of Social and Cultural
Anthropology (Chicago: Rand McNally, c1973), p.580; and Steven Lukes, ‘Political Ritual and Social
Integration,’ Sociology 9 (1975): 289–308, p.290.
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the sacrifices made by rulers to their dead ancestors and other individuals with
significant contribution to the dynasty.5 The religious root of li as well as its
continued association with Chinese religions is displayed in the 礻radical of the
character 禮, which it shares with the character shen 神, used to translate ‘god.’
While the Western studies of ritual influenced by Emile Durkheim view ritual as
social activity pertaining to the sacred as opposed to the profane, in ancient China, the
boundary between the sacred and the profane, or between religious and secular, was
never very clearly drawn.6 The earliest li could be viewed both in terms of commu-
nication with those in a supernatural or sacred realm and therefore as religious
activities, and in terms of their sociopolitical functions, particularly those contributing
to group bonding, and to establishing and sustaining political legitimacy.
The Chinese had long been proud of their ‘polity of ritual and ceremony’ (liyi
zhibang 禮儀之邦). Historian Michael Nylan observes,
One could hardly overestimate the importance of ritual to the premodern society
in China, for the single term ‘rites’ or ‘ritual’ (li) denoted the full panoply of
appropriate – and thus mutually satisfying – gestures built upon emotional
insights, expressed in dress, countenance, bodily posture, or verbal phrasing,
and designed to strengthen communal bonds (among the living, the living and
the dead, or with the gods). Ranging from the simplest verbal formula to the
most elaborate institutions, the rubric of ‘rites’ and ‘ritual’ included the obser-
vance of taboos, the offering of solemn sacrifices to the dead, the institution of
sumptuary regulations, and the exchange of pleasantries and courtesies.7
Very early in their history, the agrarian Han Chinese differentiated themselves from
the surrounding nomadic tribes by their dietary habits, clothing styles, and especially
their marriage and mourning rituals. In their complex interactions with other groups over
the centuries, this ritual culture has often been given more weight than ethnicity when it
comes to what it means to be ‘Chinese.’8 During the late imperial period, Confucian li
was the focus of the Qing gentry’s cultural reform, to reshape their relationship with
the imperial state under the Manchu and with the common people. It became a
powerful symbol of Chinese identity in varied responses to the Manchu conquest.9
Twentieth-century anthropologist, James L. Watson, affirms that,
If anything is central to the creation and maintenance of a unified Chinese
culture, it is the standardization of ritual. To be Chinese is to understand, and
5 Wu Shizhou, op. cit., pp.4-7.
6 Durkheim, Emile, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964). For more
detailed discussion of what may be called Chinese ‘secular religiosity,’ see Sor-hoon Tan, ‘Secular
Religiosity in Chinese Politics: A Confucian Perspective,’ 95–122, in Michael S.H. Heng and C.L. Ten
(eds), State and Secularism: Perspectives From Asia (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), pp. 104–107.
7 Michael Nylan, ‘Li (Ritual, rites, decorum, propriety, codes of conduct),’ 356–58 in Xinzhong Yao (ed.),
Routledge Encyclopedia of Confucianism, vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 2003), p.356.
8 Evelyn Rawski, ‘A Historian’s Approach to Chinese Death Ritual,’ 20–34, in Watson, James L. and
Evelyn S. Rawski (eds), Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1988), p.33.
9 Chow, Kai-wing, The Rise of Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1994), chapter 2. Evelyn Rawski suggests that ‘Rites, probably performed, were an essential
component of Chinese identity in the late imperial period, and probably a long time before.’ See op. cit.
p.32.
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accept the view, that there is a correct way to perform rites associated with the
life-cycle, the most important being weddings and funerals.10
The reference for the term ‘li’ varies from religious rituals, to state ceremonies, to
the institutionalized and stylized behavior of the nobility, to prescriptions on political
institutions and responsibilities of government officials, to life-cycle rites, to etiquette
and manners. The idea became one of the key ethical ideas in the teachings of
Confucius in the Analects, interconnected with other key ideas of ren (humaneness,
benevolence, or co-humanity), yi (appropriateness, what is right and proper), and zhi
(wisdom). One could understand the Confucian conception of li as including all the
norms for human actions, roles, and institutions. Such norms are the valued forms of
acting and living transmitted from generation to generation – in guiding and govern-
ing our actions, they are endowed with the authority of tradition and continued social
affirmation and expectation. Such norms are contextual rather than absolute princi-
ples or laws. Unfortunately, over time the prevailing ritual forms in China became
rigid codes of conduct and reified traditional mores that perpetuated less than perfect
social institutions and practices of imperial dynasties, and were often used as tools of
social and political control justified by an ideology that went by the name of
Confucianism. Little wonder that rituals were the target of the May Fourth iconoclasts
who wanted to demolish the ‘Confucian shop’ in their pursuit of science and
democracy. The May Fourth Chinese rejection of Confucian ritual teachings notwith-
standing, Western scholars who helped to revive academic interest in Confucianism
in the twentieth century have looked upon ritual more favorably. Herbert Fingarette
brings out this centrality of li in The Secular as Sacred, which begins with a chapter
on ‘Human Community as Holy Rite,’ and concludes with a depiction of a human
being as a ‘holy vessel,’ distinguished from beasts and inanimate things, and given a
special dignity and power via participation in li.11 Robert Neville’s recommendation
of Confucianism as a ‘world philosophy,’ drawing on Charles S. Peirce’s semiotics to
reconstruct a contemporary theory of ritual based on Confucian understanding of li,
shares this emphasis on ritual.12
Xunzi’s Ethics of Ritual: Personal Cultivation, Sociopolitical Order,
and Knowledge
Ritual already occupies an important place in Confucius’ teachings about personal
cultivation, social harmony, and good government.13 Xunzi went much further in his
emphasis on ritual. Every chapter of the Xunzi except two (‘Confucius’ and ‘Warning
Vessel on the Right’) mentions li, and one whole chapter is devoted to a ‘Discourse
on li.’ I shall examine what Xunzi believed to be the roles of ritual in various
10 Watson, James L., ‘The Structure of Chinese Funerary Rites: Elementary Forms, Ritual Sequence, and
the Primacy of Performance,’ in Watson and Rawski, op. cit., 3–19, p.3.
11 Herbert Fingarette, Confucius−the Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp.1-17, p.71.
12 Robert Cummings Neville ‘Confucianism as a World Philosophy,’ Presidential Address for the 8th
International Conference on Chinese Philosophy, Beijing, 1993, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 21.1
(1994): 5–25; See also Boston Confucianism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000),
pp.15-23.
13 Some passages showing this include Analects 2.3; 3.19; 4.13; 9.11; 12.15; 13.4; 14.41.
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domains of life, from personal cultivation, to good government, to making
judgments about the world and acquiring or producing knowledge. Xunzi’s
ethics may be called an ethics of ritual because ritual is present and governs
everything ethical and more. Masayuki Sato remarks, ‘It was in li that Xunzi saw
the ultimate answer to all kinds of ethical, social, and political problems, e.g., the
control of human desires, the appointment of high governmental officials, the allo-
cation of social resources, and the establishment of social order.’14 There is
substantively much more about ritual in the Xunzi not just because the text is longer
than the Analects or the Mencius. Beyond elaboration, one could argue that Xunzi
elevated ritual above other ethical notions, such as ren and yi, which were given equal
or greater ethical weight in the Analects and the Mencius. Compared with these two
pre-Qin thinkers retrospectively associated with the Ru school, which became known
as ‘Confucianism,’ Xunzi ‘is best remembered as the great defender of Confucian
ritual.’15
The Xunzi has a chapter on personal cultivation, which identifies li and trustwor-
thiness (xin信) as the ‘measure of excellence’ to be employed in all circumstances ‘to
control the vital breath and nourish life,… to cultivate one’s character and strengthen
oneself’(2/5/11; 1:152).16 The ancient kings, who ‘minutely observed ritual so that
wherever they went in making the circuit of the world, their acts involved no
impropriety’ (12/57/27; 2:179), provided models for personal cultivation by showing
how ‘ritual will rectify the warp and woof, the straightaways and byways of one’s
life’ (1/4/2; 1:141). Rituals guide every aspect of a worthy life (2/5/14; 1:152).
Personal cultivation does not happen by chance but requires commitment to learning.
In Xunzi’s understanding of learning, the ‘proper method is to start with the recitation
of the Classics and conclude with the reading of the Rituals’ (1/3/7; 1:139). Despite
his reverence for the classics, Xunzi recognized that book learning is not sufficient.
Mechanically following the Classics will only make one an ‘untutored Ru’ (1/3/23;
1:141). ‘Learning reaches its terminus when it is fully put into practice’ (8/33/11;
2:81). Learning must transform practice, and through practice also transform the
learner’s character. ‘One who is in the process of learning is one who models action
on ritual practice.’17 ‘When rituals have been extended to the individual person, his
conduct is reformed’ (14/66/18; 2:206; also 20/100/8; 3:84). ‘It is through ritual that
the person is rectified (zhengshen 正身).’18
A person who is correct, proper, or right, and suitable as a guide or model (that is,
zheng正) uses ‘only those methods sanctioned by ritual and appropriateness’ (2/6/16;
1:154). Every aspect of such a person’s activities will be ordered wherever he or she
14 Sato, p.344.
15 John Berthrong, Transformations of the Confucian Way (Boulder: Westview, 1998), p.32.
16 Citation from the Xunzi refers to the book/page/line in the Concordance and the volume: page in
Knoblock translation. D.C. Lau and Chen Fong Ching (eds.), A Concordance to the Xunzi, ICS Ancient
Chinese Texts Concordance series no. 26 (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1996); John Knoblock (trans.),
Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, 3 volumes (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1988/1990/1994). Knoblock’s translations are sometimes modified; for example, the frequently occurring
‘liyi 禮義,’ which he usually translates as ‘ritual and moral principles,’ is replaced with ‘ritual and
appropriateness,’ since I share the view that the concept of ‘principle’ with its deontological baggage is
problematic for early Chinese philosophy.
17 2/8/4; 1:157. Cf. Knoblock’s translation of ‘fali法禮’ into ‘learns of ritual principles and of the model.’
18 2/8/1; 1:157, slightly modified: ‘individual’ replaced with ‘person.’
160 S. Tan
may travel or dwell, in any circumstances, be it in poverty or wealth. Learning must
be ‘perfected in ritual’ (1/3/10; 1:139), so that it could fulfill its aim of ‘first to create
a scholar and in the end to create a sage’ (1/3/7; 1:139). The scholar (shi士) follows
ritual norms ‘to cultivate his own person’ (2/7/6; 1:155). A sage is one who ‘acts in
accordance with the requirements of the indispensable points of ritual and is at ease
with them as though he were merely moving his four limbs’ (8/30/16; 2:76). Between
these two levels of ritual achievement is that of the junzi 君子, ‘who accumulates
ritual and appropriateness’ (8/34/7; 2:82).
The gentleman [junzi] is respectful but not fearing and takes strict reverent care
but is not apprehensive. In poverty and want, he is not straitened; and with
riches and honors, he is without presumptions. When he everywhere encounters
changes of circumstances, he is not reduced to extremity. This is due to minutely
observing ritual principles. Thus in regard to rituals, the gentleman scrupulously
observes their provisions and finds his security in them (12/58/1; 2:179).
As Ru learning is perfected in ritual, it follows that the measure of excellence of
one’s ritual performance also measures one’s achievement as a Ru. The Xunzi
describes the ‘Ru’ as people who ‘model themselves after the Ancient Kings and
exalt ritual and appropriateness’ (8/27/26; 2/8.2/69). The text differentiates those who
call themselves ‘Ru’ into ‘the vulgar Ru,’ ‘the cultivated Ru’ and ‘the great Ru’ partly
by their different attitudes and achievements with regard to ritual. The vulgar Ru ‘are
unaware that they should exalt ritual and appropriateness’ – they are not really Ru, as
they hold views similar to Mozi and Laozi, and merely ‘invoke the Ancient Kings to
cheat the stupid and seek a living from them,’ (8/32/17-20; 2:79). The cultivated Ru
‘exalt ritual and appropriateness’ (8/32/21; 2:80), while ‘rituals are present’ (8/32/10;
2:79) in the conduct of the great Ru, who are able to ‘hold to the guiding lines of ritual
and appropriateness’ (8/33/2; 2:80).
This distinction among different kinds of Ru is part of a broader distinction among
people according to their merits measured largely by their ritual excellence. Xunzi
advocated a kind of ritual meritocracy in which those who dedicated themselves to
ritual and achieved excellence in ritual performance are raised above others in the
social order:
Although they be the descendents of kings and dukes or knights and grand
officers, if they are incapable of devotedly observing the requirements of
ritual and appropriateness, they should be relegated to the position of
commoners. (9/35/4; 2:94)
Appointment and promotion to official positions based on ritual and appropriate-
ness apply at all levels through the Confucian advocacy of a general policy of
‘elevating the worthy and employing the capable’ (12/57/15; 2:177). Xunzi gave this
ritual meritocracy an ancient lineage, claiming that ‘men of antiquity’ practiced this
way of selecting men (12/61/6; 2:186).
In Xunzi’s ideal ritual meritocracy, everyone devotes himself/herself to perfecting
his/her conduct through ritual and appropriateness, beginning with the ruler, who sets
an example and ensures that others practice ritual and appropriateness (8/28/8; 2:70;
11/56/16; 2:169; 10/49/4; 2:138). Ritual and appropriateness are the ‘mean’ the
Ancient Kings followed in their conduct (8/28/15; 2:71), which led to good
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government, since one who governs with ritual ‘loves his subordinates as if ‘tending
and caring for a small infant’’ (11/54/11; 2:162). When the superior treats subordi-
nates according to appropriate rituals, the latter would reciprocate in a manner that
promotes effective government.
…if the superior is fond of ritual and appropriateness, if he elevates the worthy
and employs the capable, and if he has no mind for avaricious profits, then his
subject will also go to the utmost in offering polite refusals and showing
deference, will be loyal and trustworthy in the extreme, and will be attentive
to the ministers of government. (12/57/15; 2:177)
Xunzi believed that using ritual and appropriateness enable the rulers to ‘unify’ the
people (10/46/20; 2:132).
Elevating people to positions of power and superiority is not primarily about
rewarding them for ritual excellence – the reward is best understood in instrumental
terms as the incentive to encourage those not already devoted to ritual and appropri-
ateness to strive for them. More crucial to Xunzi’s ritual order is the consideration that
ritual excellence is required to fulfill the responsibilities of various social positions
well in order to bring about and sustain the Ru conception of ideal society, structured
by roles governed by ritual that provides the ethical norms relevant to each role.
Having been elevated to a superior position, one is then constantly subject to
evaluation according to the ethical norms of one’s role constituted by its appropriate
rituals. Just as ritual performance is used to measure the excellence of individual
persons in their roles, the appropriate treatment and practice of ritual also provide the
criteria for judging governments (which could be conceived as a network of different
roles). The true king is someone who ‘enhances every act with ritual and appropri-
ateness’ (9/37/19; 2:100, modified). A lord is someone who ‘employs ritual in
dividing the largess, is equitable in every case and unbiased,’ while a minister is
one who ‘waits on the lord according to ritual principles, is loyal, obedient and not
lazy’ (12/57/23; 2:178, modified).
Xunzi’s ritual meritocracy also solves the problem of social distribution which, if
not properly handled, would only result in divisive competition for limited resources
and eventually lead to poverty (9/36/2; 2:96). He advocated differential distribution
captured by the concept of ‘fen 分’ in the Xunzi.
If a society is formed without social divisions [fen], strife would result; if there
is strife, disorder ensues; if there is disorder, fragmentation results; if there is
fragmentation, weakness comes; if there is weakness, it is impossible to triumph
over objects…This is precisely why it is unacceptable to neglect ritual and
appropriateness even for the shortest moment (9/39/16; 2:104).
Xunzi found the justified basis for the inequality of fen in ritual merit. Ritual is
specifically the means by which the Ancient Kings created the requisite and appro-
priate fen (9/36/2; 2:96). When people know their place in society, are content with
what is appropriate for them, fulfill the responsibilities of their positions, and have
their achievements recognized, there is social order. The role of ritual in this social
order as conceived by Xunzi is such that it is sometimes identified with that order
itself (3/10/12; 1:176), and at other times the beginning of order (9/39/2; 2:103).
Either way, ritual plays a key role in sociopolitical order in Xunzi’s thought.
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Ritual has a cognitive role in the Xunzi. This is already apparent in using ritual as a
measure of merit since it implies using ritual to guide one’s judgment of people.
Ritual is the inch, foot, double yard, and great yard to the ruler of people for the
measurement of his servants. (8/34/18; 2:83; also 12/61/8; 2:186)
The ritual measure also extends to judging what kinds of feats or reputations one
should value. For example, Xunzi pointed out that the junzi would not value Robber
Zhi’s reputation, though ‘his name was on everyone’s lips,’ because it was ‘contrary
to what is central to ritual and appropriateness’ (3/9/4; 1:174, modified). Xunzi
advocated rejecting ‘abstruse theories and shocking propositions’ not based on ritual
and appropriateness because ‘they cannot be considered to have provided any guiding
rules or orderly norms for government’ (3/9/3; 1:174; 6/22/5; 1:224). Such accep-
tance or rejection of theories is based on perceived ethical effects of theories
purporting to guide personal or political actions that can be judged on ethical criteria.
Xunzi sometimes seems to expect ritual also to provide the standards for discrimi-
nating between the views and theories that are not obviously ethical in nature, when
he claimed that, as the ‘ridgepole of the way of man,’ ritual provides methods and
standards for all inquiries and endeavors. ‘Those who keep to the mean provided by
ritual and are able to ponder and meditate on it are said to be able to think’ (19/92/17;
3:61). Xunzi considered ‘the sage examining all in terms of ritual,’ ‘the acme of
humanity and wisdom,’ to be the highest cognitive achievement (12/58/8; 2:180).
How does ritual provide the measure for truth, so that one would not be ‘fooled by
fraud and pretense’ as Xunzi claimed (19/92/15; 3:61)? Critics who see tendencies of
pan-moralism in Confucianism might be tempted to dismiss this as an illegitimate
application of moral or ethical categories in the separate and independent domain of
factual knowledge. In response some might be tempted to challenge the fact-value
dualism that lurks beneath the claim of independence of the (factual) knowledge
domain from the ethical domain.19 While there may be good reason to challenge that
dualism and deny its salience in Xunzi’s philosophy (and early Chinese philosophy
generally), it is not very helpful in this instance if someone asks, ‘How does the ritual
measure help me determine whether to believe a claim that it is going to rain
tomorrow?’ Or ‘Is water composed of hydrogen and oxygen?’ The suggestion that
ritual has cognitive function beyond ethical judgments about character (and therefore
credibility) of the knower or the value of truths with ethical implication is not as
outlandish a suggestion as it might seem at first. Value judgment is clearly involved in
using ritual as measure, but it need not be narrowly conceived ethical or moral value.
In the religious context, ritual could be the bridge or gateway to knowledge that is not
dependent on our physical senses or instrumental reasoning, some kind of direct
access to a transcendent realm that, once gained, transforms our understanding of the
this world we live in and provide the basis for our value judgments. Interpreting
Xunzi’s claim about ritual as a measure for truth in this way definitely implies a
metaphysics. However, there are other ways of understanding the noetic functions of
ritual even in religion that do not carry obvious metaphysical baggage. For example,
19 Neville approaches this by challenging fact-value dualism with a fairly complicated argument about how
even what might at first seem purely ‘factual’ questions are ethically involved and best understood that way.
See Normative Cultures.
Li (Ritual/Rite) and Tian (Heaven/Nature) in the Xunzi 163
Theodore Jennings maintains that ‘ritual knowledge is gained through a bodily action
which alters the world or the place of the ritual participant in the world,’ and ‘ritual
may be understood as a search for an understanding of the world, as a mode of
inquiry and of discovery.’20
If we recall that ritual is not necessarily or even primarily religious for Xunzi, but
includes all norms that became adopted and transmitted as ‘valuable forms’ of
conduct in every domain of valuable human activity, then in the contemporary
context, one could understand his point as one about epistemic norms or norms of
inquiry in the acquisition and production of knowledge that, though not often
acknowledged, also has a tradition in which such norms developed through practice.
American Pragmatists have long approached knowledge in this way.21 Rituals operate
in social interaction as valued forms that generations recognized through practice as
most appropriate for conducting and advancing a group’s social life, and preserving
what is of most value from that domain. In the domain of knowledge, sociologists of
science have also recognized the operation of such norms of practice that govern
scientific inquiry. The value of social rituals lies in codifying appropriate responses to
others in social relationships and frequently encountered social situations – with
appropriateness measured by what the group judged to be felicitous or efficacious
for its continuity and flourishing. In the domain of knowledge, epistemic ritual would
codify the most appropriate responses not only to others engaging in inquiry – such as
how to agree or disagree, verify or disprove others’ knowledge claims, how to assess
theories; it would also codify appropriate responses to the subject matter under
inquiry, what kind of method to apply to what kind of questions, how to find and
handle evidence, and so on.22
Necessity of Li: Xunzi Reacting to Pressures of Rhetorical Context
Xunzi did not merely extend and reiterate the importance of ritual in early Ru
teachings about personal cultivation and good government. He sometimes made
extreme claims about its necessity for every human endeavor, even human life itself:
‘a man without ritual will not live; an undertaking lacking ritual will not be complet-
ed; and state and family without ritual will not be tranquil.’23 The context for this
push towards more extreme claims about li is Xunzi’s self-appointed role as the
defender of Ru teachings against the criticisms and contending views popular during
his times. In this role, he also criticized other Ru thinkers, including Zisi and Mencius
(6/22/8; 1:224), whose views he saw as undermining Ru learning and ritual ethics.
His famous disagreement with Mencius over the question of ‘xing 性 (human
nature),’ the topic of an entire chapter arguing that ‘Human Nature Is Bad’ is very
20 Theodore W. Jennings, ‘On Ritual Knowledge,’ The Journal of Religion 62.2 (Apr 1982): 111–127,
pp.113-14, 115.
21 See the works of Larry Hickman and Susan Haack, for example.
22 Thanks to the questions and comments of Wang Yen Lee, Hinne Hattema, and Cathy Legg, at the
Australasian Association of Philosophy 2011 Meeting in Otago University, I was able to make major
revision to this section on the cognitive dimension of ritual. Though hopefully improved with their
assistance, its inadequacy remains my sole responsibility.
23 2/5/15; 1:153. Knoblock’s translation of ‘guojia 国家’ modified: ‘nation’ replaced with ‘state and family.’
164 S. Tan
much about the nature of li and its role in ethical life.24 The badness of xing renders
necessary the learning of li with the help of teachers and model practice provided by
the sages. Xunzi maintained that ‘human nature is bad and that any good in humans is
acquired by conscious exertion (wei 伪)’ (23/113/7; 3:151). The most important of
human beings’ ‘conscious exertion’ is li. He pushed the argument further by asking a
rhetorical question: if human nature were good (as Mencius had claimed), ‘what use
would there be for sage kings, and what need for ritual and appropriateness!’ (23/115/
3; 3:155; also 23/115/12; 3:156).
The ‘Discourse on Ritual’ further illuminates the claim that bad human nature
renders li necessary. Most commentators tend to focus on Xunzi’s argument about its
necessity for social harmony through its regulation and distribution function of
‘apportioning things, nurturing human desires, and supplying the means for their
satisfaction’ (19/90/4; 3:55). Besides stable and valued ways of facilitating social
interaction, dealing with conflicting or competing desires in order to eliminate social
strife, ritual is also important in effecting mental and emotional harmony at the
personal level, as conflicting or excessive desires and feelings sometimes cause
confusion and suffering, undermine personal well being and may threaten a person’s
ethical life. Ritual contributes to personal harmony through its effects on disruptive or
harmful desires and feelings, especially during times of personal crises or significant
events. In response to Mozi’s explicit attack on ‘elaborate funeral and extended
mourning,’ Xunzi condemned some of the same excessive funereal practices of their
times – starving oneself, competing to appear distraught and emaciated – which, in
his view, were neither ‘cultivated form’ of ritual and appropriateness, nor showed ‘the
emotion proper to the filial son,’ but rather were ‘done for the sake of effect.’25 Whilst
Mozi might believe such practices to be following Ru teachings, Xunzi denied that
charge and maintained that Ru ritual practices served important functions of provid-
ing appropriate channels for emotions people felt on such occasions, as well as
displayed the appropriate distinctions that sustained social order. The disruption
caused by death gives rise to a yearning for continuity; this emotional perhaps even
existential need is met by rituals that enable people to display and highlight emotions
and attitudes, such as loyalty and filiality, appropriate to their respective relations to
the departed (19/93/6-13; 3:63).
According to Xunzi, the extended funeral, with interment only in the third month,
is ‘the expression of the most exalted thoughts of longing and remembrance,’ and is
necessary in order to give the mourners time to come to terms with their loss (19/94/1;
3:64). He drew attention to the function of the various transitions in mourning rites. In
‘adorning the dead and sending them to their grave in a fashion that resembles the
way they lived’ (19/95/6; 3:67), funeral rites allow mourners to treat the occasion as
no more than ‘a change of abode’ for the departed, and thereby mitigate their sense of
loss, and appease their longing (19/95/12; 3:67). Mixing them with ‘practices con-
trary to what is done for the living’ (19/95/8; 3:67) and using funeral objects with
24 Knoblock translates this chapter’s title Xing E as ‘Man’s Nature is Evil.’ I avoid the term ‘evil’ as its
Judeo-Christian theological connotations are inappropriate to the Chinese text. Knoblock (3:139) acknowl-
edges that e does not carry the ‘sinister and baleful overtones’ of ‘evil.’ For a more detailed discussion of
the disagreement between Mencius and Xunzi on xing, see D.C. Lau, ‘Theories of Human Nature in
Mencius and Xunzi,’ 188–219, in Kline and Ivanhoe.
25 19/94/14; 3:65–66. Cf. Mei I-pao, Motse (London: Probstain, 1934), pp. 246, 250, 252.
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forms indicating that they will never be used (19/95/11; 3:68) help mourners move
towards recognition of the differences and separation between the dead and the living.
An extended period of mourning is justified, indeed necessary, because passage of
time is required to deal with the mourners’ grief before they can ‘resume the ordinary
course of life.’ While allowing time to heal the wound of loss, ritual also limits the
grieving process; by stipulating a specific end to the mourning period (and specific ritual
acts to mark its end), it compels mourners to ‘return to daily life’ (19/96/8; 3:69) by
providing symbolic closure. This does not mean that the dead are then forgotten;
sacrificial rites take over the purpose of marking remembrance and recollection (19/
97/20; 3:72). By having specific occasions for public display of such feelings, ritual
limits the negative impact of grief and longing for the dead on the living.
Besides being emotionally traumatic for persons related to the departed, if death is
perceived as simply severing the bonds between members of a community, it could be
socially disruptive and therefore a threat to social stability and harmony, unless the
change is re-presented as a transformation of the relationship as the departed merely
moved to a different world continuous or overlapping with those still living, or even a
different dimension of the same world. Mourning ritual enables its participants to
view death as a change in rather than an end of important social relationships. In its
social aspect, they also maintain distinctions of social relationships that are necessary
to an ideal social order. For example, the mourning period varied, as the degree of
grief is supposed to vary, according to the closeness and importance of the
relationship.
Why does mourning extend into the third year? I say that the practice matches
emotions and establishes cultivated forms, Following them ornaments social
relations. They provide distinctions between the obligations due near and far
relations and the eminent and humble…The greater the wound, the longer it
remains; the more pain it gives, the more slowly it heals. The practice of
mourning into the third year deals with occasions when the extreme pain of
grief has reached its pinnacle. (19/96/4; 3:69, modified)
Mourning rituals continue the main function of many rituals of social interaction
among the living, which maintain social distinctions by symbolic displays, among
others, including those of authority and social prestige.
Thus, the Son of Heaven has the Great Chariot and rush mats to care for his
comfort. On either side of the chariot fragrant marsh angelica is placed to care
for his sense of smell. In front of him there is the inlaid yoke shaft to nurture his
sense of sight. There are the harmonious sounds of the tinkling bells on the
horse's trappings; the chariot moves along in time with the ‘Martial’ and
‘Imitation’ music; and the horses gallop in time with the ‘Succession’ and
‘Guarding’ music–all in order to nurture his sense of hearing. There is the
dragon banner with nine scallops to nurture a sense of sacredness about him.
There are the recumbent rhinoceros, the crouching tiger, back harnesses with
scaly dragon patterns, the silken carriage coverings, and yoke-ends with drag-
ons to nurture his majestic authority. (19/90/11; 3:56)
To the more egalitarian-minded Mozi, deployment of resources should attend to
only utility that remains the same for all, rather than to social distinctions – for
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example, vehicles only need to be ‘safe to ride and easy to pull’ for everyone, and
boats and oars are made only for crossing the rivers, and there is no need for ritual
distinctions in their use by people with different social positions.26
What critics such as Mozi considered unnecessary extravagance, Xunzi argued is
necessary for those occupying positions of authority to discharge their responsibilities
and maintain social order and harmony (10/45/16; 2:129). Mozi insisted that the
ancient sage-kings abided by a code of simplicity in food and drink.27 In contrast,
Xunzi pointed out that human beings do more than fill their bellies when eating (19/
90/4; 3:55). Xunzi’s defense of the Ru ideal of ritually governed life and social order
against Mohist attacks is based on a contending belief that merely fulfilling the basic
physical need for food, shelter, and security is not enough to make life human. For
human beings to ‘live’ is to distinguish himself or herself from the beasts; that is why
Xunzi believed that without li, ‘a person cannot live.’ What Xunzi advocated as
human includes cultural advance or civilization; one might associate this with his
concern for wen 文, which often occurs together with li in the text.28 Knoblock
translates wen as ‘refinement’ (1/3/11; 1:140), more often ‘good form’ (3/9/16;
1:175), ‘cultivated form’ (19/94/14; 3:66 and 19/96/4; 3:69), and on at least two
occasions, as ‘culture’ (9/35/5; 2:94 and 22/107/21; 3:127). Human beings distin-
guish themselves from other animals by their ability to create culture (wen), that is, to
civilize (wen) the fulfillment of their biological and other needs through rituals that
display the qualitative distinctions needed for social order and excellence (10/43/1;
2:122). What is necessary for human life qua human is more than biological survival.
The complex social order made possible by qualitative distinctions and other
differentiations not only regulates the appropriate distribution of resources, but also
facilitates achievements beyond the capacity of what appeared to Xunzi to be crude
and primitive standards of living advocated by Mozi, who misdiagnosed the problem
of the ‘inadequacy’ confronting human societies.29 Following Mozi’s formula for
government would make people deprived and produce only social anarchy (10/45/7;
2:128). Ritual is necessary to prevent anarchy, and appropriately practiced, would
increase a society’s prosperity. Xunzi defended the Ancient Kings’ institutionalizing
‘sharp divisions,… not merely out of reckless extravagance or a boastful fondness for
elegance, but rather in order to brightly illumine the cultivated forms of humaneness
(ming ren zhi wen 明仁之文) and to make comprehensible the accord with humane-
ness (tong ren zhi shun 通仁之顺)’ (10/43/11-13; 2:124, modified). From Xunzi’s
perspective, expenditure on ritual is more than compensated by the social good it
delivers. It is the neglect of ritual and appropriateness, preferring profit and worldly
achievement instead, which will impoverish a country.
Ritual refines sensibilities and cultivates dispositions that elevate human beings
above crude materialistic concerns. Xunzi criticized Mohist and similar views
26 Mei, p.242.
27 Mei, p.240.
28 The (Lau and Chen) Concordance lists 12 places where the two characters appear in the same phrase; and
there are 40 occurrences of wen in the ‘Discourse on Ritual.’
29 Mozi’s ideal society is condemned as crude and primitive in 10/45/7; 2:128. For defense of the division
of labor needed for meeting more sophisticated human needs, see 10/42/16-17; 2:121. For explicit criticism
of Mozi for his mistaken view of the ‘inadequacy’ human societies should worry about, see 10/44/20;
2:127.
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emphasizing lì 利 – which Mozi probably understood as ‘benefits’ but Xunzi as
‘materialistic profit’ – by contrasting the undesirable personal characters and social
environments resulting from such preoccupations (10/47/12; 2:134) with societies
that uphold and promote ritual and appropriateness (10/47/13-15; 2:134). Xunzi
incorporated the Mohist concern about ‘moderation in use of goods’ – quite com-
patible with Confucius’ preference for frugality (Analects 3.4; 7.36; 9.3) – but
insisted that moderate use of goods must be carried out according to ritual, if it
is to ‘let the people make a generous living through the exercise of government’
(10/42/23; 2:121). Insofar as the argument for ‘moderation in use of goods’ is
deployed against ritual expenditure, it indicates to Xunzi a preoccupation with
materialistic gains that would end up impoverishing rather than enriching the
state.
If others act contrary to ritual requirements to moderate their use of goods, then
they are sure to have a reputation for confiscating property out of utter avarice,
and for all that they will have a harvest amount to less than nothing in times of
need and want. (10/42/27; 2:122)
Not only is ritual necessary to solution of sociopolitical problems within a state, it
is even necessary in interstate relations (10/48/14; 2:136 also 11/49/16; 2:150), and in
an imperfect world, even in warfare.30 For Xunzi, it is a mistake to think that states
are preserved, expanded, or strengthened through military exploits alone – even when
these are necessary, their success or failure depends on much more fundamental
factors of government, the chief of which is ritual practice and appropriateness (15/
69/13; 3:221). He went so far as to claim that, when it came to strengthening the state,
‘the fate of the state lies with its rituals’ (16/75/9; 2:239). Why did Xunzi think that ‘if
the ruler does not exalt ritual, then the army will be weak’ (10/47/19; 2:134)? Xunzi
recognized that the ability to motivate people is the key to success in warfare and
other cooperative endeavors. He maintained that materialistic rewards and punish-
ment are inadequate to motivate people for really difficult tasks: ‘a policy of using
rewards and commendations, or punishments and penalties, or authority and dissim-
ulation, is inadequate to exploit the strength of the people and make them willing to
die for you’ (15/73/12; 2:231). Xunzi is convinced that the people prized ritual and
appropriateness very highly for ‘nurturing life and bringing about the enjoyment of
peace’ (16/77/12; 2:244). ‘Ritual and appropriateness that instruct the people cause
them to make a common effort’ (15/70/13; 2:224). It is only in a state governed by
ritual and appropriateness that the people are unified and even willing to die for their
ruler because the latter has gained their loyalty and devotion (15/68/6; 3:219). Such a
ruler has achieved ‘the highest and most awesome authority,’ not by force and terror,
but by the ritual excellence advocated by the Ru way (16/75/13; 2:239).31 Ritual is
30 Knoblock (3:57, 316) notes that one section (15/729 to 15/739) discussing ritual in the chapter on
‘Debate on Warfare’ is included in the Shiki kaichū kōshō quotation from the ‘Discourse on Ritual;’ even
excluding that section, ritual is discussed in several other parts in the debate with Lord Linwu about war.
31 16/77/6; 2:243. Cf. the behavior of the legendary bad kings, Jie and Zhou, who were abandoned by the
world, due to their ‘bringing chaos to the divisions of social functions inherent in ritual and appropriateness,
and behaving like wild beasts’ (18/84/7; 3:35).
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therefore necessary to win the people’s support, strengthen their state against other
states with predatory interests, and bring order to the world (16/79/8; 2:249).
Li’s Cosmic Dimension and the Metaphysics of Ritual
The more extreme of Xunzi’s claims about li were often a reaction against competing
schools of thought or explicit attacks on Ru teachings. Many of these rivals were
mentioned by name in the text; a whole chapter is devoted to attacking ‘twelve
Masters.’ Chapters on topics such as ‘enriching,’ ‘strengthening’ the state, and
warfare, were not traditional Confucian concerns.32 Most of his defense of ritual
focused on the practical functions of ritual. One would expect this, given that Xunzi was
trying to persuade a world preoccupied with very real problems, competing
with contemporary thinkers offering advice on how to govern well, to win
wars, or to live a secure and prosperous life in an age of chaos. However, some
intellectual historians have argued that his audience was broader than that; for
example, Sato maintains, ‘The quest for metaphysical principles was one of the
main characteristics of the intellectual activities of the Jixia Academy in its
heyday.’33 As a member of the Jixia academy, Xunzi might also have to address such
metaphysical concerns. According to Sato, even before Xunzi’s time, the concept of li
had reached a high level of abstraction and was a ‘metaphysical principle’ in that it
‘represented the order of the natural, social, psychological worlds.’34 He argues that
there is a metaphysical dimension in Xunzi’s thought, in the concepts of tian and dao,
although it is subordinate to his interest in social order.35
Despite Xunzi’s insistence that li was created by the Ancient Kings, which points
towards ritual being human inventions or social constructions, some passages seem to
give li a basis beyond human experience, showing how the latter is interwoven into
and dependent on a larger world, often referred to as ‘heaven and earth’ (tiandi) or
‘heaven’ (tian).
Ritual has three roots. Heaven and earth are the root of life. Forebears are the
root of kinship. Lords and teachers are the root of order. … Thus, rituals serve
heaven above and earth below, pay honor to one’s forebears, and exalt rulers
and teachers. (19/90/20; 3:58, modified)
How do rituals serve heaven above and earth below? The answer lies in the
conduct of the exemplary person (junzi) who, being ‘the beginning of ritual and
appropriateness,’ ‘acts with ritual and appropriateness, actualizes them, accumulates
them over and over again, and loves them more than all else’ (9/39/2; 2:103).
32 Knoblock (2:113) contextualizes the chapter on ‘Enriching the State’ within the challenge of the thinking
of reformers such as Guan Zhong and Shang Yang who linked economic management and power; he also
points out that the Jinizi記倪子, a text attributed to Fan Li範蠡, a contemporary of Confucius, contained a
book with the title ‘On Enriching the State.’ The chapter on ‘Enriching the State’ in the Xunzi mentions
Mozi by name most frequently (10/44/20; 10/45/4,6,7,9,13; 10/46/2), and its discussion of the relevance of
‘moderating the use of goods’ (jieyong) in enriching the state is in direct reference to theMozi, which has a
chapter with that title.
33 Sato, p. 230.
34 Ibid., p. 235.
35 Ibid., pp. 335–36.
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Heaven and earth gives birth to the junzi, and the junzi brings orderly pattern [li
理] to heaven and earth. The junzi is the triadic partner of [can 參] heaven and
earth, the summation of the myriad of things, the parents of the people.36
Insofar as ‘heaven and earth’ or ‘heaven’ involved some kind of cosmology, these
passages point towards some assumed metaphysical basis for Xunzi’s ritual ethics.37
For the most part, the term ‘Heaven and Earth’ (tiandi 天地) seems to refer to the
totality of existence that might be understood as equivalent of a cosmos including the
natural world and the world created by human beings, although it remains unclear
whether some kind of purpose or value is an intrinsic part of this cosmos. The
statement that the junzi ‘brings an orderly pattern’ to heaven and earth needs
unpacking. How extensive and enduring are the changes the junzi is supposed to be
able to bring about in the cosmos? The ‘regulations of a true king’ do not pertain only to
rituals governing social interactions, but also ensure that all agricultural, fishing, and
hunting activities are carried out in the proper seasons, and the use of the myriad things
produced by heaven and earth follow an orderly pattern. A sage king ‘scrutinizes heaven
above and establishes on earth below; he fills up and puts in order all that is between
Heaven and Earth; and he adds his works to the myriad things’ (9/39/23; 2:105). Under
such an ideal ruler, there is harmony not only among human beings, but also between
human beings and the rest of the cosmos (11/56/23; 2:170; also 10/45/22; 2:130). The
failure of human beings to fulfill their responsibility for order could result in chaos of
cosmic proportions: ‘Heaven and earth exchange places’ (26/125/13; 3:202).
The effect of ritual on the cosmos is however not without limits. Xunzi rejected the
supposed magical or ‘supernatural’ function of rituals common during his time, such
as those implied in praying for rain, or ‘saving’ the sun or moon during eclipses.
Xunzi insisted, ‘We do these things not because we believe that such ceremonies will
produce the results we seek, but because we want to embellish such occasions with
ceremony’ (17/82/6; 3:19). Extending his analysis of ritual, we might say that these
rituals are ways of working through our feelings, anxiety in particular, and they help
us cope with difficult situations and threatening events. Not knowing the limits of
human ability to affect the cosmos amounts to a failure to grasp the division between
tian and human beings, and recognize their respective roles. ‘Heaven has its seasons;
earth its resources; and man his government’ (17/80/2; 3:15). What are purely matters
of tian, such as the seasons, cannot be changed by humans – attempting to do so
amount to ‘competing with tian in its work’ (17/80/1; 3:15). The division between
tian and humans does not mean that human beings should simply ignore tian. Some
things, even though resulting from tian, human nature, for example, can be trans-
formed and refined, put to good use, wasted, or abused. It is necessary to observe tian
(9/39/22), to understand tian (17/80/15; 3:16) and act in harmony with it. This
harmony is often expressed by an ‘orderly pattern’ (li 理), which stresses the
seasonable and timely in ritual performance, for example in ‘employing familiar foods’
36 9/39/3; 2:103, Knoblock’s ‘provides the organizing principle for’ replaced with ‘brings orderly pattern
to.’ Cf. Sato’s ‘appreciates the principle (i.e., order)’ (p. 320).
37 According to Sato, Xunzi was influenced by the Jixia thinkers, for whom the idea of being a triadic
partner of heaven and earth signifies an analogical relationship between the natural and human. He argues
that Xunzi’s ‘combination of Confucian ethical discourse with a Jixia argumentative framework’ provides
‘pre-Qin Confucianism with a metaphysical conceptual framework.’ (Sato, p. 323.)
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(19/21/9; 3:59). One could therefore understand the ‘triadic partnership’ in terms of an
interdependence whereby human beings create order in the cosmos, including but not
limited to the sociopolitical realm, by responding appropriately to given environment or
circumstances not within human control but determined by tian. Grasping the division
between tian and humans enables one to concentrate on what lies within one’s power
in order to make progress in ethical living (17/81/5; 3:18), achieve order in the state,
and live in harmony with nature, through ritual (17/82/12; 3:20).
If Xunzi’s use of the concepts of tiandi and tian was in response to the metaphysical
interests of his contemporaries, to what extent did he share their cosmologies
embedded in those concepts? The text devotes a whole chapter to a ‘Discourse on
Tian,’ in which Xunzi apparently rejected some views popular during his time. Most
contemporary scholars credit Xunzi with a view of tian very close to the modern, even
scientific, view of nature as without purpose or normative content.38 One reference of
‘tian’ in the text is to ‘the revolutions of the sun and moon and the stars and celestial
points that mark off the divisions of time by which the calendar is calculated’ and the
seasons, spring and summer, autumn and winter (17/80/21; 3:17), which supports an
understanding of tian as natural phenomena. The ‘Discourse on Tian’ begins with a
statement about the ‘constancy’ of tian and its apparent neutrality or indifference to
human ethical conduct,
…it does not survive because of the actions of a Yao; it does not perish because
of the actions of a Jie. (17/79/16; 3:14)39
It goes on to deny that tian could be responsible for poverty, illness, famine,
calamity, or misfortune; rather it is human actions that fail to respond appropriately
to natural phenomena that bring these about (17/79/16; 3:14). For example, a poor
harvest need not result in starvation unless one has not stored up excess crops during
times of plenty. Tian appears to be nature without purpose or value, indifferent to
human likes and dislikes (17/80/27; 3:17), neither showing them favor nor bearing
them malice. Xunzi rejected as superstition the reading of unusual events in nature –
eclipses, unseasonable weather, appearance of new stars – as omens to be feared (17/81/
10; 3:18).40
Not everyone agrees with the reading of tian in the Xunzi as a proto-scientific view
of nature without purpose and value. While not entirely rejecting that reading, Robert
Eno also discerns in the Xunzi a second theory of tian as nature with ethical
significance, providing the basis for ritual in the normative components of human
psychology, and serving as a prescriptive model for emulation.41 Eno argues that the
38 Edward Machle attributed this trend to a desire to link China’s quest for modern science with its own
tradition. Nature and Heaven in the Xunzi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 7–8. For
a recent discussion of rendering of tian as ‘nature’ is adequate, see Lee, Xunzi and Early Chinese
Naturalism, pp. 22–24. Lee concludes, ‘the nonpurposive and nonintervening feature of tian is revealed
in its spontaneous, magical way of working independently from human beings’ strenuous and deliberate
way of doing. However, the realm of tian is not totally inaccessible to human beings because they can
participate in the order of tian by building a flourishing, orderly society’ (p. 24).
39 Cf. Machle’s (p. 77) translation: ‘…it did no special act toward Yao’s survival, nor towards Jie’s fall.’
40 Goldin points out that Xunzi was challenging the omenology popular in ancient China, evident in many
pre-qin texts (pp. 39–47).
41 Eno, p. 132, pp. 157–65. Other uses of tian as a normative term do not refer to nature, but adopt
conventional uses of tian ‘as god, as ethical precept, or as fate’ (p. 133).
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depiction of the human mind creating value and calling it tian-like (17/80/10; 3:16)
indicate that tian is being used as a normative term.42 This is debatable, as one could
argue that calling faculties ‘tianguan天官’ means that they are ‘endowed by nature,’
and the fact that the mind judges fortune and misfortune by whether something
‘accords with its species’ means that judgment, even ethical decisions and actions,
takes into account (but is not necessarily reducible to) natural characteristics. To
Goldin, Xunzi sounds like an eighteenth-century deist, for whom reason is the faculty
given to human beings by God to discover his will, which means perceiving the laws
of nature.43 Goldin is of course aware that God as the author of nature is conspicu-
ously absent in early Chinese thought, but a connection between nature and morality
could be effected through natural capacities that perceive natural order and create
morality on that basis. Goldin notes that ‘Xunzi postulates a definite order to nature,
and maintains that it is not merely good, or profitable, for us to conform to that order,
but essential to the noble journey.’44 For Xunzi, the faculties endowed by tian, when
fully developed and employed with excellence, as they were by the sage kings, enable
these individuals to ‘know heaven’ and thereby to create the rituals for future
generations to follow.
Although the junzi is said to ‘bring orderly pattern’ to tian, at times Xunzi seemed
to believe that the basis of man-made order lies in ‘heaven and earth.’ While human
beings create rituals making the distinctions necessary for social order, such distinc-
tions seem to model a larger natural, possibly cosmic, hierarchy.
Just as there are heaven and earth, so too there exists the distinction between
superior and inferior, but it is only with the establishment of intelligent kingship
that the inhabitants of a kingdom have regulations. (9/35/22; 2:96)
Even though the human way, as exemplified by the Ancient Kings following ritual
and appropriateness in their conduct, is ‘not the Way of Heaven’ (8/28/15; 2:71), the
‘constant Way’ of Heaven nevertheless serves as a model to the junzi in its constancy
(11/3/4-5, 1:178; 17/81/1; 3:17).45 One to whom the world would willingly submit
because of his great ethical excellence ‘is as complete as heaven and earth, which
embrace the myriad things,’ since ‘there are none he does not love, none he does not
respect, and none with whom he would contend.’46 The sage is often associated with
heaven and with the ‘greatness’ of heaven and earth.47 Are these merely metaphorical
usages or do they indicate a normative understanding of tian, which could point
42 Eno, p. 161.
43 Goldin, pp. 51–54.
44 Goldin, p. 53. Cf. Lee’s view that, although Xunzi was critical of the naturalism in the thought of early
Chinese thinkers such as Mencius and Zhuangzi, his emphasis on human morality being the product of
human effort is accompanied by a belief that human morality ‘reflects the structure of natural order’ and
that the ‘isomorphic relation to the way things really are’ prevents li from being merely conventional and
arbitrary (p. 92).
45 Machle (p. 77) draws our attention to the normative connotations of xing and chang in other usages in the
text.
46 6/23/17; 1:227. See also 10/42/9; 2:122, citing the Book of Documents, ‘How broadly protective is
Heaven! Moral power like this will make your own person prosperous.’
47 3/11/9; 1:178, 8/34/4; 2:82 and 19/92/18; 3:61. See also description of the ruler with best kind of
authority instilled by the Way and its power, cultivating ritual and appropriateness, being ‘raised as high as
Heaven’ (16/75/14; 2:239, modified).
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towards a metaphysics of ritual in the Xunzi? In presenting the idea of tian as ‘one
aspect of Xun Qing’s metaphysics’ (p.29), Machle concludes that Xunzi had little
interest in the mapping of the cosmos, but adapted some of the conventional
cosmological thinking of his time for his own purpose. He judges Xunzi’s contribu-
tion to the ‘metaphysics of value’ as more significant in reconciling ‘the orderly value
guarantees of Tian and the disrupted life of the people on earth’ (p. 37).
Eno sees the realms of nature and man in the Xunzi as a ‘continuum with a
teleological direction,’ implying ‘a level above both natural and human dimensions.’
In his reading, the text comes close to ‘a systematic metaphysical model hypostatiz-
ing this cosmic integration as a transcendental realm of reality’ in the ideas of shen
(‘spirit’) and tai-yi (‘Great Oneness’).48 However, he admits that the latter term is too
hazy to even merit speculation (p. 175). For Eno, whether descriptive and natural, or
prescriptive and metaphysical, tian is not the point, since the text ‘is not primarily
concerned with the philosophical task of formulating consistent metaphysical theory’
(p. 155). I agree with Eno that whatever metaphysical assumptions there might be in
the Xunzi, they serve to defend his theory of ritual. If the inconsistencies and
ambiguities of the usages of tian are any indication, those metaphysical assumptions
are probably unclear and apparently inconsistent. While he might not have been able
to avoid metaphysical assumptions, Xunzi did not deem it necessary to have a viable,
defensible metaphysical theory.
Was Xunzi wrong? Would his ritual ethics be strengthened with a systematic
metaphysical theory? If so, one possible approach would be to go along with the
scientific world view and approach ritual with the tool of biological and social
sciences. Xunzi’s ritual ethics could be tested and extended with these tools, and
applying it to solve contemporary problems would be a matter of incorporating ritual
into scientific efforts to explain and guide human actions. The proto-scientific reading
of tian leans towards this approach. However, if nature is without purpose and value,
then it is not a suitable object for veneration. Instead, it would need to be transformed
and refined, perfected and completed by human beings living ethically. To remain
true to Xunzi’s Confucianism, we cannot take for granted that whatever science in its
manipulation of nature makes possible is ipso facto acceptable. Were Xunzi alive
today, he would probably say the study of nature and other scientific inquiries should
also be conducted with ritual and appropriateness.
What of the metaphysical assumptions portraying tian as normative, perhaps even
transcendent? Those preferring the approach of ‘going with science,’ where science is
associated with a value-free conception of nature, could interpret such usages of tian
as metaphorical and avoid attributing normativity to tian itself, or dismiss them as
conceding to assumptions popular in Xunzi’s times that are unnecessary to the
defense of his ritual ethics. It is an advantage that not every metaphysical assumption
in the text is necessary to defend Xunzi’s theory of ritual (even Xunzi’s account of
ritual itself might be modified to some extent without abandoning his Ru philosophy
altogether), since some of those assumptions may not be viable today and perhaps not
even decipherable. However, simply adopting the dominant metaphysical assump-
tions of our age may be no better than Xunzi’s unexamined assumptions, even if it
facilitates acceptance of his ritual ethics.
48 Eno, p. 153.
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The best Confucians have never shrunk from swimming against the tide; one
might even say that their most important achievements that have continued to shine
through the ages lie in questioning popular opinions as well as criticizing the
powerful. From that perspective, we should hesitate to fit Xunzi’s ritual ethics into
modern science and popular social theories, and certainly we should resist scientistic
reduction. Neville picks up the critical (some might say subversive) potential of
Xunzi’s metaphysical assumptions when he sees in ancient cosmological themes ‘a
powerful antidote to the fact/value distinction.’49 Neville proposes that we construct
for Xunzi’s theory of ritual ‘a contemporary metaphysics that shows how things have
value, and how their relations constitute obligations on human beings irrespective
sometimes of whether human beings recognize those values…that articulates the
ancient themes of pervasive and differential value that determines that to which
human beings should defer.’50
While it will be possible to recover from Xunzi’s philosophy a theory of ritual
emphasizing its various functions that could be adapted to contemporary living
without any metaphysical inquiry, its impact would be limited. There is also a serious
risk that the most distinctive parts of the theory would be discarded because they do
not fit with the most common metaphysical assumptions of the day. Reconstructing
its metaphysical dimension would contextualize Confucian ritual theory within a
larger worldview that challenges the status quo precisely where the differences lie,
even as that reconstruction takes into consideration contemporary criteria of viability.
Where Xunzi’s tools appear inadequate to solve a contemporary problem, it might be
(though not always) the problem that needs reformulating, or it may turn out that we
should be attending to some other problem, the solution of which would also get rid
of what we mistake to be the problem. We are unlikely to develop such new
perspectives from Xunzi’s philosophy if we simply try to fit his thought into the
current worldview in a piecemeal fashion, without the integrative breadth and depth
of metaphysical inquiry. However, this would not be the traditional metaphysical
inquiry. While there is no space to embark on the task itself, this article will conclude
with some remarks on what kind of metaphysical inquiry might be appropriate for
recovering the full potential of Xunzi’s philosophy of li.
Taking the cue from Neville, the relation between tian and li clearly has significant
implications for the fact/value distinction. Working out these implications could be a
good starting point for the task of constructing a contemporary Confucian metaphys-
ics of ritual. The views of metaphysical import in the Xunzi are usually asserted in the
course of defending the importance of Confucian li. Therefore, the metaphysics for
Xunzi’s ritual ethics would have to be pragmatic in that its theses about the generic
character of experience would make a difference to the actual functioning of ritual.
The task is not to derive the Confucian ethics of ritual from metaphysical grounds,
whether excavated from ancient texts, borrowed from some contemporary sources, or
arbitrary speculations, but rather to inquire into the generic character of experience
from the ethical standpoint of Confucian li as practice. This endeavor will bring
Xunzi into philosophical conversation with Modern Neo-Confucian philosophers as
well as Western philosophers rethinking the approach to metaphysics.
49 Neville, Ritual and Deference, p. 93.
50 Ibid., p. 94.
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The pervasive and fundamental importance of ethical practice in the Confucian
worldview implies that ethics would have priority over metaphysics. Modern Neo-
Confucians, who insist that philosophy is primarily metaphysics, have reconstructed
Confucian metaphysics on the basis of Song-Ming Confucianism’s ‘philosophy of
heart-mind-and-nature’ (xinxing zhi xue). Their Confucian metaphysics is also
grounded in ethical practice, most evident in Mou Zongsan’s idea of moral meta-
physics, which approach ontological and cosmological knowledge through moral
practice.51 Given that Mou’s new Confucianism follows Mencius, his moral meta-
physics would not fit well with Xunzi’s philosophy. The differences between Mou’s
moral metaphysics and the ritual metaphysics reconstructed from Xunzi’s Confucian-
ism will probably mirror the differences between the two pre-Qin Confucians’ views
about xin and xing.
The priority of ethics and the pragmatic tendency in Xunzi’s philosophy resonates
with Sami Pihlström’s argument in his Pragmatist Metaphysics that because our
approach to reality is practice-laden, it is also value-laden, and therefore metaphysics
must be grounded in ethics rather than the other way round. Pihlström begins from
the Kantian starting point that it is impossible to give an account of reality, a
metaphysics giving the ‘basic structure’ of the world, as it is in itself independent
of all human perspectives; but instead of thereby rejecting metaphysics altogether, he
maintains that ‘What we can examine in metaphysics is the way(s) in which we
categorize the world we experience, the general traits of the world experienced and
experienceable.’52 Pihlström combines Kant’s transcendental method with the Prag-
matists’ articulation of metaphysics that ‘seeks to determine the true core of meta-
physical disputes and theories by examining their conceivable practical results.’53
Furthermore, ‘the conceivable practical results the pragmatist metaphysician should
seek are, primarily, ethical.’54 Quite apart from offering a method conducive to
reconstructing Xunzian metaphysics, this Pragmatist metaphysics opens up an avenue
for Xunzi, through the reconstruction of a Confucian metaphysics of ritual, to
contribute to the contemporary conversation about metaphysics.
51 For a more detailed account of Mou Zongsan’s account of moral metaphysics, see Sor-hoon Tan,
‘Contemporary Neo-Confucian philosophy,’ 539–70, in Bo Mou (ed.), History of Chinese Philosophy
(London and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 559–62.
52 Sami Pihlström, Pragmatist Metaphysics: an Essay on the Ethical Grounds of Ontology (London:
Continuum, 2009), p. 89.
53 Ibid., p. 7.
54 Ibid., p. 92.
Li (Ritual/Rite) and Tian (Heaven/Nature) in the Xunzi 175
